There are widely acknowledged ethical issues in enrolling unconscious patients in research trials, particularly in intensive care unit (ICU) settings. An analysis of those issues shows that, by and large, patients are better served in units where research is actively taking place for several reasons: i) they do not fall prey to therapeutic prejudices without clear evidential support, ii) they get a chance of accessing new and potentially beneficial treatments, iii) a climate of careful monitoring of patients and their clinical progress is necessary for good clinical research and affects the care of all patients and iv) even those not in the treatment arm of a trial of a new intervention must receive best current standard care (according to international evidence-based treatment guidelines). Given that we have discovered a number of 'best practice' regimens of care that do not optimise outcomes in ICU settings, it is of great benefit to all patients (including those participating in research) that we are constantly updating and evaluating what we do. Therefore, the practice of ICUbased clinical research on patients, many of whom cannot give prospective informed consent, ticks all the ethical boxes and ought to be encouraged in our health system. It is very important that the evaluation of protocols for ICU research should not overlook obvious (albeit probabilistic) benefits to patients and the acceptability of responsible clinicians entering patients into well-designed trials, even though the ICU setting does not and cannot conform to typical informed consent procedures and requirements.
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An increasingly difficult situation is arising in many jurisdictions in Australasia in conducting clinical research on incompetent patients (e.g. emergency department, stroke and dementia patients and critically ill patients in intensive care), including trials that compare different existing (or non-experimental) medical therapies that are not well-established in their effectiveness. These are often investigator-initiated, pragmatic, phase III or phase IV effectiveness trials (versus the commercial efficacy phase III trials). While guardian tribunals exist in some states in Australia and may grant permission for the next of kin to give informed consent for clinical research, many states still do not have any legal provisions to allow the next of kin to give informed consent for clinical research, although they can give informed consent for medical treatment including organ donation after cardiac death. In the past, many ethics committees used next of kin acknowledgement to allow incompetent individuals to be enrolled in clinical trials and with subsequent patient informed consent when they regained competence. This practice is, however, questionable and indeed the rules have been changed recently so that such a practice is only allowed in negligible or low-risk research when any adverse events associated with a trial cannot be more than just mild discomfort. Arguably, this conservative position reflects the relative (or absolute) ignorance that patients, families and policymakers have about the extent and quality of evidence to support much of the care provided in intensive care units (ICUs). Would attitudes to research be different if it was clearly understood that so little of what is done on a daily basis is based on high-quality evidence and, moreover, that when we do test things that we think are going to work we not uncommonly find the opposite? The issue is compounded by the problem that for many clinical trials on sick and incompetent patients, we cannot clearly determine whether any potential adverse events that occur during the course of ICU treatment are truly related to the trial intervention itself or the underlying disease process that causes patients to be critically unwell. Because of the conservative shift in practice by many ethics committees in Australasia, many investigator-initiated (or non-commercial) clinical trials have not been able to get through the ethics committees and, hence, are not able to be started, even But the divergence in perceived permissibility prompts certain questions. Is it acceptable that Australasian hospitals are condemned to treating their patients in increasingly outdated ways and yet are forbidden to contribute to the development of new methodologies of care? Is it ethical to the ethics committees if we treat all our patients in a certain way in one hospital and a completely different way in another hospital, when both ways of treating the patients are considered clinically acceptable but with uncertain relative effectiveness? Conversely, would it be unethical if patients in both hospitals are randomised to be managed by one of these two acceptable ways and would that change if any potential associated adverse events of the clinical interventions were more than mild discomfort? Should we go on rigidly adhering to established practices and disallowing innovation even if shortcomings in those established regimens are suspected?
In intensive care, there are standard practices which, as is the case throughout medicine, either outstrip the best evidence for their efficacy in the conditions they are used to treat or are being constantly improved to increase their safety and/or efficacy. ICU specialists are activists (and therefore, in one important respect, like surgeons) and experimentalists because they deal with a constantly evolving range of conditions that shift from the category of 'fatal' to the category of 'seriously life-threatening' or 'potentially rescuable'. ICUs also require rapid definitive intervention, often under extreme time pressure and despite considerable uncertainties about the clinical situation or the best way to treat it. Therefore, it is not surprising that many of our treatments, as in crisis medicine in general and in surgery, are based on current theories about the human body and its workings and things that have been found to work in some cases but not definitely proven as effective and safe interventions. In intensive care, we have near total control over what goes on in the body; we have drugs to manipulate bodily physiology, we regulate breathing patterns, we induce unconsciousness and so on. Importantly, however, we are working by guesswork as much as, and no more than, in any other complex area of science but the complexities of holistic human function can sometimes confound the 'knowledge' that our theories endorse (as we see in the case of alternative healing methods and things like the placebo effect). It is also clinically and ethically significant that many ICU interventions, applied in good faith in managing critically ill patients, can turn out to be harmful. What follows are some examples help to illustrate this point.
It is reasonable to believe that because blood carries oxygen and nutrients around the body and nature has designed the human blood system to work with a certain level of haemoglobin, then maintaining a level close to that would provide optimal conditions for healing and recovery from major trauma or illness. Not so. An important study found that patients maintained at a haemoglobin level of 100 to 120 g/l (close to the normal values of 120 to 180 g/l) fared worse than those who were only transfused when they dropped below 70 g/l 1 .
It is plausible that patients who have cardiac arrhythmias after heart attacks are at greater risk of death than others and therefore, that antiarrhythmic drugs would be of benefit to such patients in terms of mitigating that risk. Indeed, it seems almost unethical not to give such drugs to patients after heart attacks. Not so. A prospective randomised controlled clinical trial of antiarrhythmics against placebos showed a totally unexpected increased death rate in the actively treated group 2 .
Decompressive craniectomy is becoming a valuable tool in the management of patients with severe traumatic brain injury on the basis that a number of studies have demonstrated that, in the context of intractable intracranial hypertension, either a bilateral or unilateral decompression can achieve the 'physiological' goal of lowering the intracranial pressure 3 . However, while raised intracranial pressure following traumatic brain injury is highly predictive of mortality, surgical intervention may not necessarily provide clinical benefit because the procedure is associated with a number of complications, many of which can have a significant effect on outcome. A recent Discovery Early Career Researcher Award study compared early bifrontal decompression with standard medical therapy for patients with severe traumatic brain injury and raised intracranial pressure (>20 mmHg for more than 15 minutes) 4 . It found that, although the intracranial pressure was lower in patients who had decompression, their outcome was worse than in those patients who received standard medical therapy 5 . It is therefore important that even something as compelling as an urgent life-saving surgical intervention should be thoroughly investigated by appropriate clinical trials.
In each of these cases, we see that plausible theories about the human body and how it works, apparently well-reasoned clinical practice and even felt demands to rescue patients 6 can mislead us about whether this or that intervention is beneficial so that we need careful clinical trials to tell us whether our beliefs about the right way of treating certain serious conditions actually are correct. Thus, there is a real need in intensive care (as there is in surgery) to perform the trials that will show us what should be done in a given clinical situation, but there is also a need to protect patients from unilateral decision-making that may put them at risk (as we saw in the Cartwright inquiry that led to a reformation in New Zealand medical ethics).
But this immediately provokes a set of questions about the need for informed consent to medical research. This need should be discussed in light of the facts already mentioned, which ground a number of substantial conclusions about research on those who cannot give consent. In fact, those conclusions are predictable from i) a rational preference for the best treatment, ii) an informed discussion of clinical decision-making, iii) the need for clinical trials in modern medicine so that we all benefit from evolving and improved medical care and iv) the best interests of patients who cannot speak for themselves. Six arguments for ICU research even on unconscious patients flow from these considerations.
Firstly, any person making choices about treatment should opt for the treatment that stands the best chance of returning him or her to health. There may, however, be specific reasons why some particular intervention is not acceptable to a person, for instance a Jehovah's Witness patient may, on the strength of their interpretation of the Old Testament, refuse a blood transfusion. We could also imagine a person with extreme racist views not wanting an organ transplant from someone of a different race-a decision which might be abandoned when the patient is in extremis. On balance, however, a treatment decision for any individual in accordance with the majority view is most likely to coincide with the view of the patient (absenting clear reasons to think otherwise).
Secondly, it is most rational for any patient to accept the best available treatment according to the current state of knowledge at the time of their illness and contemporary clinical care, particularly in academic hospitals, recognises that this is the prevailing standard of treatment. But it is quite possible that an ideally informed clinician would be unable to decide between a currently accepted standard treatment and a suggested modification or innovation. In such a case, the doctor does not know whether the treatment proposed for a given patient at a given time is the best thing to do or whether what is being trialled may be significantly better (given that safety assessments have been completed). Therefore, from the patient's point of view, the patient has no reason to opt for the standard treatment rather than the other possibility being considered. In fact, the patient, given that they and others like them may require further treatment at a later date, has a definite interest in doctors getting to know as much as possible about their condition and its treatment, so as to make well-considered judgements about ongoing management. This is most likely to happen in the context of a well-designed scientific trial where rigorous monitoring is the rule (and where the patient is guaranteed to get treatment equal to the currently accepted standard of care). Now, given that a treatment in an ICU is only trialled if it is unclear whether a new treatment actually offers more benefit to patients than existing options, it follows that it should be a matter of indifference, ethically speaking, which of the two arms of a clinical trial (the treatment arm, where something new is tried, or the control arm, where standard treatment is used) any given patient is assigned to. For this reason it is best, on the grounds of self-interest or optimal care of the patient, for an ICU patient to be enrolled in a trial of treatment where a sensible question can be asked about how they ought to be treated.
Thirdly, it would be in accordance with good care and the best interests of patients, more broadly conceived of, for people to want to contribute to medical knowledge in conditions of uncertainty. This is almost self-evident because it is always good for a healthcare system to be extending and using knowledge about a patient and their problem and there are real benefits to a patient in being cared for by a medical system in which active clinical research is going on. Indeed, given that there is a certain amount of community feeling in all of us, we should all want the members of our community to benefit from lessons learnt when misfortune befalls any of us if we can be sure that gaining that knowledge will not increase the risks of our own clinical treatment. In retrospect, of course, it may turn out that patients enrolled in one or other arm of a study (sometimes the opposite one to that expected) have been disadvantaged by the clinical trial but that fact cannot be known at the time of enrolment and the dangers continue to exist until the relevant facts are discovered.
Therefore, we should conclude that clinical research trials of treatment in ICUs expose no patient to any extra risk over and above those that exist for them by virtue of their eligibility for the trial and that the cessation of that research means that they and their fellow citizens will probably be exposed to unnecessary risks in the future.
Fourthly, it is reasonable to assume that everybody has a degree of altruism, however limited, and that it should be encouraged by ethicists for the following reasons: 1. Most people have a positive interest in the wellbeing of the fellow members of their community and in the best treatment being used in the care of the community. 2. Where someone stands to gain by a community practicesuch as best ICU treatment and the research that underpins it-we should support and participate in it. 3. We all recognise that altruism is something to which, in our best moments, we aspire so it does no harm to assume that people should be treated in a way that reflects that value (unless that decision runs counter to one's own objective best interests). Therefore, we should be prepared to be enrolled in properly conducted trials of ICU research even when we cannot consent. Fifthly, relatives are often badly placed to make life-anddeath decisions as has been objectively demonstrated and is easy to understand 7 . All the uncertainties associated with life-and-death decisions cluster around every conversation between an ICU team and relatives. In addition to the informational turmoil, there is an emotional cauldron-some feel shocked, others guilty and yet others protective. So a mortal decision must be made in a context that is heavily overlaid by issues of technology, urgency and the power of the medical establishment; and there are often conflicted feelings so that it is unrealistic to believe that anything like informed consent can prevail. In reality, we can only hope for a sensitive and supportive partnership between the clinical team and the patient's whānau (extended family) and a climate in which a duty of care has been clearly thought through.
Sixthly, clinical staff have a duty to make the best decisions for any given patient, to be suitably sensitive to the realistic interests, concerns, fears and expectations of ordinary folk (and not be influenced by distorting factors such as extreme right-to-life or euthanasia views, the fear of litigation or financial gain). That implies that the best chance of getting soundly researched clinical care in an area of medicine where intuitions and theory-based reasoning can both mislead even the best of well-intentioned clinicians is if we continue to enrol unconscious patients in clinical trials. The invariant duty for a doctor or medical team to practice according to a good standard of care is universal and it sometimes means that the wishes of relatives, when they are not in accordance with a careful and informed assessment of the best interests of the patient, must be set aside. That implies that where there is an objective chance of better treatment within the context of a clinical trial than there is if we follow current established practice, we could be considered to have a duty to participate in and give our patients access to such trials. That duty and the decision that is made is the only rational expression of our professional duty to care for each patient and to make their wellbeing our primary concern.
So what is the ethically defensible alternative to the status quo? We should trust ICU clinicians to grasp instances of true equipoise and the need for further research and to carry it out in well-designed physician-initiated trials of treatment. Such regimens of care are held to, and the standards of accountability, professional scrutiny and clinical policy need to reflect that fact and be more clearly outlined to staff and patients. Society requires of us a high degree of professionalism and that should include i) ethics committee oversight that is robust and dynamic so that what we do to our patients-both in established therapy and experimental treatment-meets the standards of a duty of care properly reflective of scientific evidence and a dedication to patient wellbeing, ii) external scientific review to ensure that what is being proposed in such a trial will see that appropriate existing standards of care are upheld for all trial participants, iii) solid pre-clinical data to exclude any known harm and support a real prospect of benefit for a new experimental therapy and iv) a commitment to trialling new treatments against best-standard regimens.
In reaching such a conclusion, any review body will need to consider not only the absolute risk of harm but also the additional (marginal) risk over and above the condition and its usual treatment. If two alternative treatments are in widespread use, but their relative effectiveness is not known, then a clinical trial to compare them and the relative indications for each is not merely desirable but, one could plausibly argue, the only ethical way to proceed.
It is always best for the clinical team looking after any patient to make an evidence-based plan for that patient's management, especially when the patient is incompetent and their life is in danger. It is clear that in ethical terms, this should be the default position and the plan should reflect best current practice (as practical in the context) with disputed cases being arbitrated by some suitably impartial body such as an ethics committee and with the courts being used only when, here as elsewhere in medical care, things cannot be managed in a better way. In any event, it seems that, in ethical terms, the general practice of doing ICU research should be commended under the condition that the clinical team, acting in good conscience, can enter their patients into well-designed trials, even where informed consent prior to entry into the trial cannot be obtained.
Editor's Note
Some of the issues discussed in this article have been published and discussed on the Internet through science blogs (http://sciblogs.co.nz/guestwork/2014/05/19/researchethics-and-trials-on-unconscious-patients/>sciblogs.co.nz/.../ research-ethics-and-trials-on-unconscious-patients; http:// blogs.otago.ac.nz/bioethicscentre/>blogs.otago.ac.nz/ bioethicscentre) and are elaborated in this article for further debate and discussion.
